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MORTGAGES - NORTH DAKOTA'S ANTI-DEFICIENCY
STATUTE DEFINED
Harold J. Bergquist (Bergquist) defaulted on a note to the Fed-
eral Land Bank of St. Paul (Land Bank) which was secured by a
mortgage on his farmland in Walsh County, North Dakota.1 After
the Land Bank foreclosed its mortgage, Bergquist's land was sold
at a sheriff's sale for $139,000.00.2 The Land Bank then sued
Bergquist in a separate action for a deficiency judgment.3 The
Land Bank asserted that after the sheriff's sale there remained a
balance due on the note of $138,160.55. 4 A jury trial was held to
determine the fair value of the land pursuant to section 32-19-06
of the North Dakota Century Code.5 At trial Bergquist testified
1. Federal Land Bank v. Bergquist, 425 N.W.2d 360, 361 (N.D. 1988). In 1982
Bergquist applied for and received a loan for the purpose of refinancing existing debt. Brief
of Appellee at 1, Federal Land Bank v. Bergquist, 425 N.W.2d 360 (N.D. 1988XNo. 870245).
2. Bergquist, 425 N.W.2d at 361.
3. Id. Under section 32-19-06 of the North Dakota Century Code, known as the Anti-
Deficiency Statute, a deficiency judgment is calculated by subtracting the fair value of the
mortgaged property as determined by a jury from the amount adjudged due in the
foreclosure action plus interest and costs. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-06 (1976). For the
relevant text of section 32-19-06, see infra note 4. Section 32-19-06 also requires that a
lawsuit in which a lender seeks a deficiency be brought in an action separate- from the
foreclosure action. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-06 (1976). Section 32-19-06 of the North
Dakota Century Code provides in part:
[Wihere a note or other obligation and a mortgage upon real property have been
given to secure a debt. . . and the sale of the mortgaged premises has failed to
satisfy in full the sum adjudged to be due and the costs of the action, the plaintiff
may, in a separate action, ask for a deficiency judgment, if he has so indicated in
his complaint, against the party or parties personally liable for that part of the
debt and costs of the action remaining unsatisfied after the sale of the mortgaged
premises.
Id.
4. Bergquist, 425 N.W.2d at 361. The amount of the deficiency is generally calculated
by subtracting the amount of money received at the sheriff's sale from the total amount due
on the note at the time of default, plus any costs of the foreclosure action. See generally
Washburn, The Judicial and Legislative Response to Price Inadequacy in Mortgage
Foreclosure Sales, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 843, 845-46 (1980). For purposes of granting a
deficiency judgment in North Dakota, however, the amount of the deficiency is calculated
by subtracting the fair value of the mortgaged property as determined by a jury from the
amount of the debt unpaid plus costs and interest. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-06 (1976)
(anti-deficiency statute). Section 32-19-06 of the North Dakota Century Code provides in
part:
The court... may render a deficiency judgment against the party or parties
personally liable, but such deficiency judgment shall not be in excess of the
amount by which the sum adjudged to be due and the costs of the action exceed
the fair value of the mortgaged premises .... [T]he determination of the fair
value of the mortgaged premises shall first be submitted to a jury... and no
deficiency judgment can be rendered against the party or parties personally
liable unless the fair value of the mortgaged premises is determined by such jury
to be less than the sum adjudged to be due and the costs of the action.
Id.
5. Bergquist, 425 N.W.2d at 361. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-06 (1976) (anti-
deficiency statute). For the relevant text of section 32-19-06 of the North Dakota Century
Code, see supra notes 3 and 4.
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that in his opinion the land was worth $277,180.55; however,
Bergquist was not allowed to introduce testimony about the
amount of the mortgage, the amount of debt due and owing on the
note to the Land Bank, or the existence of a second mortgage
which also encumbered the land.6 The Land Bank's expert wit-
ness, a real estate appraiser, stated that the fair market value of the
land was $139,000.00.7 The real estate appraiser was allowed to
testify that there was no difference between the terms "fair value"
and "fair market value."' Fair value was not defined by the court
for the jury, nor was the jury advised of the effect of the fair value
determination.9 The jury set the fair value of the land at
$210,000.00.10 Accordingly, the district court entered a deficiency
judgment in the amount of $67,160.55 plus costs, disbursements,
and interest." Bergquist appealed, alleging that the trial court
erred in failing to adequately instruct the jury on the concept of
fair value, in allowing the Land Bank's expert to testify that fair
value is the same as fair market value, and in refusing to allow the
parties to advise the jury of the effect of its determination of fair
value.' 2 The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the term
"fair value" is the value that will produce a fair and equitable
result between the parties and that fair value is determined by
looking at all the evidence bearing on the value of the land and
the circumstances underlying the debt. 13 Federal Land Bank v.
Bergquist, 425 N.W.2d 360 (N.D. 1988).
Prior to the Depression of the 1930s, the Federal Land Bank
and other real estate lenders, in North Dakota and in other states,
were allowed to foreclose on mortgaged property and seek a defi-
ciency judgment from the debtor if the foreclosure sale did not
6. Bergquist, 425 N.W.2d at 361-63. For a discussion of factors which the court in
Bergquist stated were valid for consideration by the jury in a deficiency action, see infra
notes 55-56.
7. Bergquist, 425 N.W.2d at 361.
8. Id. at 363. Q. (Mr. Ramrud) "Is there any difference between market value and fair
market value?" A. (John V. Botsford) "No, there isn't." Record at 19, Bergquist (No. 12579).
9. Bergquist, 425 N.w.2d at 363. Under section 32-19-06 of the North Dakota Century
Code, the Land Bank could only receive a deficiency judgment if the fair value of the land
was determined to be less than the amount remaining due on the loan. See N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-19-06 (1976) (anti-deficiency statute). For the relevant text of section 32-19-06 of
the North Dakota Century, see supra notes 3-4.
10. Bergquist, 425 N.W.2d at 361.
11. Id. To arrive at the amount of the deficiency judgment, the district court
apparently added the total debt which was alleged to be due after the sheriff's sale
($138,160.55) to the sale price of the property at the sheriff's sale ($139,000.00) and
subtracted the amount determined by the jury to be the fair value of the land ($210,000.00).
Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 364.
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completely satisfy the debt. 4 In the 1930s however, many states
passed statutory enactments to limit or prohibit deficiency
judgments.15
The North Dakota Legislature passed the first North Dakota
anti-deficiency statute in 1933.16 This enactment, found in chap-
ter 155 of the 1933 Session Laws (1933 anti-deficiency statute),
provided that the courts would have no power to render a defi-
ciency judgment.' In 1934 the North Dakota Supreme Court in
Burrows v. Paulson 18 construed the 1933 anti-deficiency statute as
being procedural in that it merely required lenders to foreclose on
the property and then bring a separate action against the debtor
for a deficiency judgment.' 9 The result of the decision in Burrows
was that deficiency judgments were prohibited as a part of a fore-
closure action; however, separate actions for deficiency judgments
were permitted.2 °
In response to the Burrows interpretation of the 1933 anti-
deficiency statute, the North Dakota Legislature amended the
1933 anti-deficiency statute in 1937 by enacting chapter 159 of the
1937 Session Laws (1937 anti-deficiency statute).21 In the 1937
14. See East Grand Forks Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Mueller, 198 N.W.2d 124, 129
(N.D. 1972) (reviewing the historical background of section 32-19-06 of the North Dakota
Century Code); Washburn, supra note 4, at 843 (during the Depression, properties
foreclosed upon were sold for nominal amounts, resulting in the borrower losing the
property while remaining liable for any deficiency judgment). See generally, Skilton,
Assessing the Mortgage Debtor's Personal Liability, 90 U. PA. L. REv. 440 (1942Xdiscussing
measures for the relief of debtors).
15. Washburn, supra note 4, at 843. Washburn notes that during the Depression
property regularly sold for nominal amounts at foreclosure sales resulting in the debtor
losing the property and remaining liable for a large deficiency judgment. Id. State
legislatures therefore enacted statutes limiting or prohibiting deficiency judgments to
resolve this problem. Id.
16. See First State Bank v. Ihringer, 217 N.W.2d 857, 858 (N.D. 1974) (reviewing the
legislative history of North Dakota Century Code section 32-19-06). See also Act of March
7, 1933, ch. 155, 1933 N.D. Laws 223-24 (amended in 1937 and 1951) (codified at N.D.
CENT. CODE § 32-19-06 (1976)). Chapter 155 of the 1933 Session Laws provided in part:
"Whenever an action shall be brought for the foreclosure or satisfaction of a mortgage,....
the court shall have no power to render a deficiency judgment." Id.
17. Act of March 7, 1933, ch. 155, 1933 N.D. Laws 223-24 (amended 1937 and 1951)
(codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-06 (1976)).
18. 64 N.D. 557, 254 N.W. 471 (1934).
19. Burrows v. Paulson, 64 N.D. 557, 559, 254 N.W. 471, 473 (1934). Burrows
concerned the cancellation of a land sale. Id. at 557, 254 N.W. at 472. The plaintiff,
Burrows, had sold land to the defendant, Paulson. Id. at 557, 254 N.W. at 472. The contract
for sale contained a clause which stated that the contract could be canceled if the laws of
the State of North Dakota were such that a mortgagor might not be held personally liable
for the mortgage debt. Id. at 557, 254 N.W. at 472. Burrows sought to have the land sale
contract canceled because of the enactment of the 1933 anti-deficiency statute. Id. at 557,
254 N.W. at 472. The North Dakota Supreme Court construed the 1933 anti-deficiency
statute to be merely procedural and thus held that to obtain a deficiency judgment under
the statute, the mortgagor was merely required to bring a separate action at law. id. at 560,
254 N.W. at 473.
20. Burrows, 64 N.D. at 563, 254 N.W. at 474.
21. First State Bank v. Ihringer, 217 N.W.2d 857, 858 (N.D. 1974). See Act of March 1,
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anti-deficiency statute the legislature made it clear that its inten-
tion was to abolish deficiency judgments. 22 Thus, the 1937 anti-
deficiency statute precluded courts in the State of North Dakota
from granting a deficiency judgment, making the holding of the
North Dakota Supreme Court in Burrows inapplicable to notes
secured by mortgages and land contracts entered into after July 1,
1937.23
In 1951 the North Dakota Legislature responded to the state
agricultural industry's need for long-term low-interest loans
secured by real estate mortgages by amending the 1937 anti-defi-
ciency statute.24 The 1951 amendments put the North Dakota
anti-deficiency judgment law in substantially its present form.25
The 1951 changes, currently found in chapter 32-19 of the North
Dakota Century Code, changed the 1937 anti-deficiency law by
allowing deficiency judgments to be entered under limited condi-
tions.26 However, several safeguards were placed in the statute
for the protection of the mortgagor. 27  One of the principal safe-
guards for the mortgagor in the 1951 amendments was the con-
1937, ch. 159, 1937 N.D. Laws 296-97 (amended 1951) (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-
19-06 (1976)).
22. See Act of March 1, 1937, ch. 159, 1937 N.D. Laws 296-97. The 1937 anti-
deficiency statute provided in part:
[T]he Court shall under no circumstances have power to render a deficiency
judgment for any sum whatever. . . . § 2. OTHER SUITS PROHIBITED. That
neither before or after the rendition of the judgment and decree herein
provided for, shall the mortgagee or contract holder, or their successors [in]
interest, be authorized or permitted to bring any action in any Court in this State
for the recovery of any part of the debt secured by said mortgage or contract so
foreclosed.
Id. For the relevant text of the current codification of this act as amended in 1951, see
section 32-19-06 of the North Dakota Century Code, supra notes 3 and 4.
23. East Grand Forks Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Mueller, 198 N.W.2d 124, 129 (N.D.
1972XTeigen, J., dissenting).
24. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-06 (1976) (anti-deficiency statute). See also 1hringer,
217 N.W.2d at 859 (reviewing the statutory history of North Dakota Century Code section
32-19-06). The North Dakota Supreme Court in Ihringer noted that the reason for the
change in the statutory scheme regarding deficiency judgments was due to the fact that the
Federal Land Bank, one of the principal lenders in the State, was refusing to make loans
unless deficiency judgments were permitted. Id. See also 1951 REPORT OF THE
LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM. ON H.B. 541, at 37 (1951) [hereinafter 1951 REPORT]
(Federal Land Bank would return to business in North Dakota if absolute prohibition of
deficiency judgments was removed).
25. hringer, 217 N.W.2d at 859. Compare N.D. REV. CODE 9 32-1904 to -1907 (Supp.
1957) (1951 anti-deficiency statutes) with N.D. CENT. CODE 9 32-19-04 to -07 (1976)
(current anti-deficiency statutes).
26. lhringer, 217 N.w.2d at 859-60. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-06 (1976Xanti-
deficiency statute).
27. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-19-04 to -07 (1976) (original version at 1951 N.D. Laws
300-03). The North Dakota Legislative Research Committee in its discussion of the
proposed 1951 changes stated: "That while the proposed bill technically makes deficiency
judgments possible, it surrounds the mortgagor with safeguards which in actual practice
would make a deficiency judgment almost impossible except in a very deserving case."
1951 REPORT, supra note 24, at 38-39. The report produced by the Legislative Research
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cept of fair value as determined by a jury.28
The concept of fair value as used in North Dakota's statutory
scheme appears to have been adopted from several other states
which had implemented a fair value approach in Depression-era
deficiency judgment statutes.29 The principal purpose of the fair
value concept is to safeguard mortgagors from unreasonably high
deficiency judgments due to the absence of competitive bidding at
mortgage foreclosure sales.30
Several states, including California, continue to use the fair
value concept in their deficiency judgment statutes.3' The Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal for the Third District interpreted the
meaning of "fair value" as it applied to California's deficiency
judgment statute in Rainer Mortgage v. Silverwood Ltd.32 The
Committee also summarized the most important phases of the bill containing the changes
proposed in 1951:
1. [W]here a mortgage is foreclosed the fair value of the mortgaged property
must be credited against the... indebtedness... and .. a deficiency judgment
can be entered only where the amount of the debt exceeds the fair value of the
mortgaged premises;
2. The determination as to the fair value of the mortgaged premises is to be
made by a jury;
3. [I]n the event a deficiency judgment is obtained, it cannot be enforced by
execution after three years from the date of the rendition of such judgment.
Id. at 39.
28. 1951 REPORT, supra note 24, at 39. For the relevant text of the 1951 Report, see
supra note 27.
29. See 1951 REPORT, supra note 24, at 36. At the time House Bill 541 was being
considered, Wisconsin, Michigan, Texas, California, and New York required that fair value
be used in determining the amount of a deficiency judgment. Id. The 1951 Report noted:
"Some states.., require that thefair value instead of the bid price in the foreclosure sale be
used in determining the amount to be applied against the debt." Id. (emphasis original).
30. See Washburn, supra note 4, at 908 (purpose of anti-deficiency statutes is to prevent
the injustice resulting from a sale below market value). See also Skilton, supra note 14, at
451-54 (anti-deficiency statutes result in more good than harm because of the widespread
practice of nominal bidding and latent unfairness in the system allowing credit for the
foreclosure price).
31. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726(b) (West Supp. 1989) (anti-deficiency statute);
Washburn, supra note 4, at 908 (seventeen states provide that a deficiency judgment must
be based on the greater of a statutorily determined fair market value or the foreclosure sale
price).
32. 163 Cal. App. 3d 359, 362, 209 Cal. Rptr. 294, 295 (1985). See CAL. CIv. PROC.
CODE § 726(b) (West Supp. 1989) (anti-deficiency statute). In Rainer Mortgage v.
Silverwood Ltd. the plaintiff/mortgagee, Rainer Mortgage, foreclosed on two deeds of trust
given by the defendants/mortgagors, Silverwood Ltd. and Golden Oaks Ltd., in return for
two promissory notes. Rainer, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 362, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 294. The
defendants had defaulted on the notes and the parties had stipulated to judgments on the
notes of $442,798.33 to Golden Oaks and $294,726.86 to Silverwood. Id. at 362, 209 Cal.
Rptr. at 295. The two properties given as security were sold for $290,445.60 and
$211,700.00 respectively. Id. at 362, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 295. Rainer then made an
application for deficiency judgments pursuant to section 726 of the California Civil
Procedure Code. Id. at 362, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 295; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726(b) (West
Supp. 1989) (anti-deficiency statute). Section 726(b) of the California Civil Procedure Code
provides in part:
In the event that... it is decreed that any defendant is personally liable for the
debt, then upon application of the plaintiff and after a hearing thereon at which
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plaintiff/mortgagee, Rainer Mortgage (Rainer), argued that fair
value must take into consideration the value of the property as
affected by the foreclosure sale.33 The defendant/mortgagor,
Silverwood Limited (Silverwood), contended that fair value meant
fair market value, undiminished by any of the disabilities that
attend a judicial foreclosure sale.34 The California statute required
the court to render a deficiency judgment for the amount by
which the indebtedness with interest and costs exceeded the fair
value of the property as of the date of the sale.35
The court in Rainer reviewed the legislative history of section
726 of the California Civil Procedure Code and found that the rea-
son for using fair value was to protect the defaulting mortgagor.36
To accomplish this legislative end, the court held that fair value
was to be determined by all the circumstances affecting the intrin-
sic value of the property at the time of the sale of the property.
The court in Rainer noted that the legislature had allocated
the risk of loss due to over-valuation of the property to the
lender.38 With this allocation of risk in mind, the court reasoned
that the lender, who makes a conscious decision as to the value of
the property prior to making a loan, cannot upon default of the
loan shift the burden of such a loss to the borrower.3 9 Thus, the
court concluded that a lender could not seek a deficiency for any
amount greater than that amount by which the debt exceeds the
the court shall take evidence and at which hearing either party may present
evidence as to the fair value of the property ... the court shall render a money
judgment . . . for the amount by which the amount of the indebtedness with
interest and costs of levy and sale and of action exceeds the fair value of the
property... as of the date of the sale.
Id.
33. Rainer Mortgage v. Silverwood Ltd., 163 Cal. App. 3d 359, 363, 209 Cal. Rptr. 294,
295 (1985).
34. Id. at 363, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 295.
35. Id. at 363, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 295. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726(b) (West Supp.
1989) (anti-deficiency statute). For the relevant text of section 726(b) of the California Civil
Procedure Code, see supra note 32.
36. Rainer, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 366, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
37. Id. at 365, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 297. The court noted that the anti-deficiency statute
was a product of the Great Depression. Id. at 365, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 297. During the Great
Depression, mortgagees could buy property on which they had foreclosed for a nominal
sum at the foreclosure sale because of the depressed property values and realize a double
recovery by holding the mortgagor liable for a large deficiency. Id. at 365, 209 Cal. Rptr. at
297.
38. Id. at 369, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 300. The court reviewed the legislative history of the
California anti-deficiency statute and found that the limitation on deficiency judgments was
intended to benefit the borrower, not to insulate commercial lenders from the risk of loss
where encumbered property declines in value. Id. at 369, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
39. Id. at 369, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 300. The court stated that "[i]f the lender overvalues
property for purposes of a loan, or misjudges the commercial viability of a real estate
project, it is entirely proper that the risk of loss be with that lender." Id. at 367-68, 209 Cal.
Rptr. at 299.
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intrinsic worth of the property. 40 Therefore, the court held that
fair value within the meaning of section 726(b) of the California
Civil Procedure Code included all circumstances which affect the
underlying worth of the property at the time of the sale.4' The
court noted that under this definition of fair value, consideration of
the impact of the foreclosure proceeding on the value of the prop-
erty was necessarily excluded.42
The court in Rainer stated that under normal conditions the
intrinsic value of the property will often coincide with the fair
market value of the property.4 3 However, this is not usually the
case when property is sold at a foreclosre sale. During the one
year redemption period, the court noted, the marketability of the
property is depressed because of the ability of the mortgagor to
redeem the property.44 Therefore, a buyer will be less willing to
purchase the property during this time period for its fair value.45
Thus, based upon these considerations, the court in Rainer found
that any effect a foreclosure sale might have on the value of the
property should be excluded from a determination of fair value.46
The court thus remanded the case with instructions to the trial
court to determine whether the fair value of the property was
equal to the fair market value of the property, excluding any
40. Id. at 369, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 300. The court noted that limiting recovery of a
deficiency judgment to the amount by which the debt exceeds the intrinsic worth of the
property may not precisely achieve the goal of encouraging the mortgagee to bid up the
property to its market value. Id. at 369, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 300. However, the court stated
that this limitation on the recovery of a deficiency judgment was a reasonable method of
achieving the legislature's goal of protecting the borrower from an excessive deficiency
judgment. Id. at 369, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
41. Id. at 365, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 297. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726(b) (West Supp.
1989). In determining that fair value within the meaning of section 726(b) of the California
Civil Procedure Code included all circumstances which affect the underlying worth of the
property at the time of the sale, the court relied on the legislative purpose of section 726(b)
which the court found to be protection of the debtor. Id. at 366, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 297. See
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726(b) (West Supp. 1989).
42. Rainer, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 367, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 298-99. The court rejected the
lender's argument that defining fair value in terms of the intrinsic worth of the property
precluded full recovery of the debt. Id. at 367, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 298. The court stated:
"Concededly, the lender who bids in the property is temporarily deprived of the difference
between the property's "fair value" and its market value as encumbered. However, this
difference is negated in a year, when the right of redemption expires." Id. at 367, 209 Cal.
Rptr. at 298-99. The court noted that if it were to hold otherwise the lender could achieve a
double recovery by simply waiting one year before selling. Id. at 367, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
43. Id. at 366, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 298. The court defined fair market value as the value a
willing purchaser will pay to a willing seller in an open market. Id. at 366, 209 Cal. Rptr. at
298. The court noted that the correlation between market price and intrinsic value,
however, is not fixed and that market value is only one factor to consider when determining
fair value. Id. at 367, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 298.
44. Id. at 367, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 298.
45. See id. at 367, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 298.
46. Id. at 367, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 298.
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effects of the foreclosure sale.47
In a case of first impression, the North Dakota Supreme Court
addressed the meaning of the term "fair value" in North Dakota's
deficiency judgment statute in Federal Land Bank v. Bergquist.4s
The Land Bank brought an action against Bergquist for a defi-
ciency judgment based on its allegation that the fair market value
of the property was less than the amount remaining on the debt.49
Bergquist contended that determination of fair value included
more than a mere inquiry into fair market value. 0
The North Dakota Supreme Court based its decision largely
on the statutory history of the deficiency judgment laws in North
Dakota. 51  The supreme court stated that the legislature had
intended fair value to have a. broad meaning embracing many fac-
tors.52 Thus, the court concluded that fair value meant the value
that would "produce a fair and equitable result between the
parties. "3
The supreme court recognized that the statute and its history
47. Id. at 369, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 300. The issue before the court in Rainer was whether
the effect of a foreclosure sale on the value of foreclosed property could be considered for
purposes of determining fair value in calculating the amount of a deficiency judgment. Id.
at 361, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 294. After determining that the effect of a foreclosure sale could
not be used, the appellate court remanded the case to the trial court for a new
determination of fair value. Id. at 369, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
48. 425 N.W.2d 360, 363 (N.D. 1988).
49. Federal Land Bank v. Bergquist, 425 N.W.2d 360, 361 (N.D. 1988). Section 32-19-
06 of the North Dakota Century Code provides that a mortgagee may seek a deficiency
judgment in the amount by which the debt adjudged to be due and owing exceeds the fair
value of the property as determined by a jury. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-06 (1976) (anti-
deficiency statute). For the relevant text of the section 32-19-06, see supra notes 3-4.
50. Bergquist, 425 N.W.2d at 361.
51. Id. at 362-63. The North Dakota Supreme Court also relied on the California case
of Rainer Mortgage v. Silverwood Ltd. in making its decision in Bergquist. Id. at 363;
Rainer, 163 Cal. App. 3d 359, 209 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1985). The court in Bergquist found the
California case relevant because the North Dakota anti-deficiency statute was derived from
the section of the California Civil Procedure Code which was construed in Rainer.
Bergquist, 425 N.W.2d at 363. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-06 note on derivation (1976)
(statute derived from Harston's (Cal.) Practice 726). Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-06
(1976) (North Dakota statute which controls deficiency judgments in all mortgage
foreclosures) with CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 726(b) (West Supp. 1989) (California statute
which controls deficiency judgments in commercial mortgage foreclosures). For the.
relevant text of N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-06, see supra notes 3-4. For the relevant text of
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726(b), see supra note 32.
52. Bergquist, 425 N.W.2d at 364. The court referred to a North Dakota case which
had recounted the legislative history of North Dakota's anti-deficiency laws including
section 32-19-06 of the North Dakota Century Code. Id. at 362. See First State Bank v.
Ihringer, 217 N.W.2d at 857 (N.D. 1974). While the court in Bergquist did not find Ihringer
helpful in determining the meaning of fair value, it did find the history of the anti-
deficiency statutes helpful in determining how broadly to construe section 32-19-06 of the
North Dakota Century Code. Bergquist, 425 N.W.2d at 362.
53. Bergquist, 425 N.W.2d at 364. The supreme court, noting its agreement with the
California decision in Rainer Mortgage v. Silverwood Ltd., stated that the legislative
protection afforded a foreclosed mortgagor did not depend upon the vagaries of the
marketplace. Id. at 363 (quoting Rainer, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 366, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 298).
Thus, fair market value may be one factor in determining the fair value of the property; fair
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authorized the jury to balance the competing interests of the
mortgagor and mortgagee in determining the fair value of prop-
erty which had been foreclosed.5 4 To effectively accomplish this
balancing of competing interests, the court concluded that all evi-
dence bearing on the value of the property and all of the circum-
stances of the underlying transaction should be presented to the
jury.55 The supreme court also recognized that under these cir-
cumstances it was appropriate to advise the jury of the effect of its
determination. 6
The supreme court also considered the Land Bank's argument
that allowing the jury to be advised of the outcome of its determi-
nation may cause juries to over-sympathize with debtors, resulting
in deliberately erroneous determinations of fair value which
would prevent deficiency judgments. 5' The court pointed out that
the legislative intent of the anti-deficiency statutes was to afford
protection to the mortgagor.58  Thus, the supreme court con-
cluded that the legislature intended to let the jury decide, on the
basis of the facts in each case, what value would produce a fair and
equitable result between the parties and whether a deficiency
judgment would be appropriate.59 Since the jury did not use this
standard in Bergquist, the supreme court remanded the case to
market value is not, however, an appropriate standard for determining the amount of
deficiency due after foreclosure. See Bergquist, 425 N.W.2d at 364.
54. Bergquist, 425 N.w.2d at 364. Although the supreme court found that the jury was
authorized to balance the competing interests of the debtor and the mortgagee in reaching
its determination of fair value, the court implied that the interest of the debtor will
generally outweigh that of the mortgagee because "the intent of the statute is to afford
every protection to the mortgagor." Id.
55. Id. The supreme court, in deciding what kind of evidence relating to fair value the
jury should be allowed to hear, stated the evidence allowed "would include, among other
things, the amount of the mortgage, the amount of any subsequent mortgages, fluctuations
in land values, and the remaining amount claimed to be due on the debt." Id. The court
recognized that market value was admissible as one factor for consideration by the jury but
that it was not the controlling factor. Id.
56. Bergquist, 425 N.W.2d at 364. The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that
advising the jury of the effect of its determination required that the jury be allowed to hear
evidence regarding the amount owed on the mortgage. Id. The court also stated that the
jury should be instructed that the mortgagee would be entitled to a deficiency judgment
only for the difference between the amount owed on the debt and the fair value of the
property as determined by the jury. Id. The court stressed that its decision did not require
juries in other types of cases to be advised of the effect of their determination of specific fact
issues. Id. n.3. However, the court concluded that because the jury in a deficiency
judgment action is to balance the competing interests of the parties, it was important to
inform the jury of the effect that its determination would have on the mortgagee's ability to
obtain a deficiency judgment. Id.
57. Id. at 364.
58. Id. The supreme court, quoting the 1951 Report of the Legislative Research
Committee, stated that the legislature also intended that "in actual practice" the deficiency
judgment statute should "make a deficiency judgment almost impossible except in a very
deserving case." Id. (quoting 1951 REPORT, supra note 24, at 37-38).
59. Bergquist, 425 N.W.2d at 364.
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the trial court for a new determination of fair value.6 °
Prior to the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision in Berg-
quist, a mortgagee could expect that the mortgagor would bear at
least some of the risk of real estate market fluctuations. 61 Berg-
quist, however, reallocates the risk of loss to lenders, who must
now bear the burden of fluctuations in market value because lend-
ers may no longer look to the mortgagor for a deficiency judgment
simply because the fair market value of the property is less than
the amount remaining due on the debt.62  After Bergquist, a
lender can seek a deficiency judgment only if the fair value of the
property is less than the amount remaining due on the note.63
This reallocation of risk may reduce the willingness of lenders to
extend loans secured by real property in the State of North
60. Id.
61. Cf. Washburn, supra note 4, at 908 (discussing fair market value statutes as a
restriction on deficiency judgments). Washburn states: "Seventeen states [including North
Dakota] have legislation providing that the amount of a deficiency judgment must be based
on the greater of statutorily determined fair market value or sales price." Id. Contra
Bergquist, 425 N.W.2d at 362. The court in Bergquist determined that a deficiency
judgment must be based upon the difference between the fair value (not necessarily the
current fair market value or sales price) and amount of the debt remaining after the
foreclosure sale. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-49-06 (1976)). Under a fair market
value statutory scheme, a determination of the availability and amount of a deficiency
judgment is made by calculating the amount of the debt due and owing on the date of
foreclosure, less the foreclosure sale price or fair market value, whichever is greater.
Washburn, supra note 4, at 908. Thus, where the real estate market is fluctuating
downward and the fair market value of the property is decreasing, the amount of the
deficiency for which the defaulting mortgagor is liable increases. See id. Because the
mortgagor's debt to the lender will only be credited with the greater of the sale price or the
fair market value, and because the foreclosure sale price will rarely if ever exceed the fair
market value of the property, the mortgagor bears the risk of downward market
fluctuations under a fair market value anti-deficiency statutory scheme. See id. While the
Bergquist decision does not overtly redistribute the risk of downward market fluctuations
from the mortgagor to the mortgagee, the Bergquist interpretation of fair value as that
value which "produces a fair and equitable result between the parties" changes the nature
of the risk born by the mortgagor from a risk of decrease in market value to a risk of being
unable to convince a fully informed jury that the amount of debt due was equal to or less
than the fair value of the property. See Bergquist, 425 N.W.2d at 364 (defining fair value as
it applies to North Dakota's anti-deficiency statute).
62. See Bergquist, 425 N.W.2d at 364 (N.D. 1988). Whether, and in what amount, a
lender is entitled to a deficiency judgment is no longer determined by the fair market value
of the property; it is determined by the fair value ("the value of the property which will
produce a fair and equitable result between the parties"), and although market value may
be one factor which affects the fair value, the lender can no longer rely on a deficiency
judgment to make up for decreases in market value. Id. Although the possibility remains
that a jury could determine that the fair value of the property is less than the amount of the
debt remaining on the mortgage, the probability of this type of determination seems slight
in light of the mortgagor's argument that the fair value must be equal to the amount of the
debt. See id. If it were not, why would the lender have borrowed the debtor that amount
of money with only the land as security. See id. Faced with this argument, it seems likely
that a jury will find that the fair value of the land is equal to the amount of the remaining
debt. See Federal Land Bank v. Bergquist, No. 12579 (N.E. Dist. Ct. Nov. 23, 1988) (on
remand the jury found the fair value to be $277,160.55, a value exactly equal to the amount
of Bergquist's debt).
63. See Bergquist, 425 N.W.2d at 364; N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-06 (1976). For the
relevant text of section 32-19-06 of the North Dakota Century Code, see supra note 4.
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Dakota.6 a Furthermore, it is likely that the Bergquist decision will
move lenders who do business in North Dakota to pressure the
1989 North Dakota Legislature to amend section 32-19-06 of the
North Dakota Century Code to require that the risk of loss due to
market fluctuations be borne, at least in part, by the mortgagor.65
The North Dakota anti-deficiency statute as interpreted by
the North Dakota Supreme Court in Bergquist places the decision
whether a deficiency judgment should be granted squarely upon
the shoulders of the jury.66 Thus, a lender seeking a deficiency
judgment is faced with the difficult prospect of convincing a jury
that a deficiency judgment is required to produce a fair and equi-
table result between the parties. In light of this burden it is
likely that lenders who operate in North Dakota will place a
greater emphasis on property valuation before making loans
secured by real property.68
Jon W Backes
64. The purpose of the 1951 amendment to North Dakota's deficiency judgment
scheme was to entice lenders such as the Federal Land Bank to return to business in North
Dakota. 1951 REPORT, supra note 24, at 37. The decision in Bergquist is not limited to
agricultural and commercial lenders such as the Federal Land Bank. Recently the North
Dakota Supreme Court read Bergquist as applicable to all lenders which hold promissory
notes secured by real estate mortgages. Schiele v. First Nat'l Bank, No. 880277, slip op. at 3
(N.D. Feb. 20, 1989) (fair value standard as determined in Bergquist applicable in
foreclosure on personal residence).
65. See S. 2346, 51st Leg. § 2 (1989) (bill which would have changed the "fair value"
language of section 32-19-06 to read "fair market value," thus changing the standard on
which a deficiency judgment is based, failed to pass by a vote of 19 for to 32 against); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 32-19-06 (1976) (anti-deficiency statute). For the relevant text of section 32-
19-06, see supra notes 3-4.
66. Bergquist, 425 N.W.2d at 364. The court in Bergquist stated that the jury is to
balance the competing interests of the debtor and the mortgagee in determining fair value.
Id. The court also noted that in order to affect this balancing, the jury could be presented
with "all evidence bearing on the value of the property and the circumstances of the
underlying transaction." Id.
67. See id. To be granted a deficiency judgment, the lender must convince the jury
that the fair value of the property, the value which will produce a fair and equitable result
between the parties, is less than the amount remaining due on the loan. Id. The difficulty
in accomplishing this task would seem to be greatly increased by the fact that the jury will
know than the effect of such a determination will be to grant a deficiency judgment against
the borrower to whom juries seem to be more sympathetic. See id.
68. Cf. Rainer Mortgage v. Silverwood Ltd., 163 Cal. App. 3d 359, 367-68, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 294, 299 (1985) (lenders who overvalue property at the time of making a loan cannot
shift the consequences of this decision to the borrower by seeking a deficiency judgment).

